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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEPHEN GUY TERRELL 
by and through his successor Guardian 
ad Litem, GLAYDE EDWARDS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
JACK E. McBRIDE and 
EDNA S. McBRIDE, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No.20040829 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the final judgment of the Utah Fourth Judicial District Court 
which a) fails to grant the Plaintiff/Appellant reasonably convenient access/easement to 
his real property located in Millard County, Utah, and b) fails to award damages in 
Plaintiff/Appellant's forcible detainer action. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j)(2005). Plaintiff appeals the judgment of the trial court under Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18a-l(2)(a)(Supp. 1991). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal are: 
1. Whether the Ruling of the trial court is clearly erroneous as the result of its 
failure to consider which access to Plaintiffs property is the most convenient to the 
dominant estate. 
2. Whether the Ruling of the trial court failing to award Plaintiffs damages 
for forcible detainer is clearly erroneous.1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard which must be applied to the factual findings of the trial court are as 
follows: 
In cases of equity, the Supreme Court may weigh the evidence and 
determine the facts but there is indulged a presumption of correctness of the 
findings and judgment of the trial court; where the evidence may conflict, 
the Supreme court will not upset the lower court's findings unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates against them. (Ovardv. Cannon, 600 P. 2d, 
1246 (Utah 1979). 
Further discussion of the standards of review for factual and for legal findings are set 
forth in the following: "An appellate court 'will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial 
court sitting without a jury unless they are . . . clearly erroneous" (State v. Irizarry, 945 
P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997) quoting inter alia MacKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 
1995)). Generally, the appellate courts reviews a trial court's legal conclusions for 
correctness, according the trial court no particular deference (See Newspaper Agency 
1
 When this brief refers to "the Ruling/' the reference 
includes the Ruling of the Court dated May 10, 2004, and the 
ensuing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, dated 
August 19, 2004. 
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Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 938 P.2d. 266, 267 (Utah 1997); State v. 
Christensen, 866 P.2d 533, 535 (Utah 1993)). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 9, 2002, Plaintiff Stephen Guy Terrell, then a 69 -year old disabled 
veteran, filed a complaint for forcible detainer and access to a 40-acre parcel of real 
property in Fillmore, Utah, which is bordered on the North, West, and East by 
Defendants' property. Defendants' fences, some of which were erected in 2002, 
landlocked Plaintiffs property and forcibly prevented Plaintiff from accessing it. In the 
trial court's Ruling dated May 10, 2004, Plaintiff was awarded an easement by necessity, 
but was ordered to access his property by using a hunting and jeep path generously 
described as "the East Road." Regarding the forcible detainer, the Ruling of the trial 
court states, "It is clear that Plaintiff is entitled to be restored access to his land." The 
Court then set forth Plaintiffs expenses of $37,754.41. However the trial court failed to 
award Plaintiff any damages for the forcible detainer, whether interest on his unusable 
expenses, nominal damages, his attorney's fees as a damage, or any other measure of 
damage. (A copy of the Court's Ruling is contained in Appendix A). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff Stephen Guy Terrell is the owner of a 40-acre parcel of real 
property located in Section 10, Township 21 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian 
and further described as follows: 
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Southwest Quarter (SW1/4) of the Northeast Quarter (NE1/4) 
of Section 10 in Township Twenty-one South Range 5 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Plaintiff acquired the land in 1998 and obtained a Mineral Lease in 1999 to perform some 
form of mining and hauling of sand and gravel from the property.(May 10, 2004, Ruling 
f 1 and 16). Plaintiff also obtained a well permit in 2001 (May 10, 2004, Ruling f 17). 
2. Plaintiff purchased equipment and construction materials for use on the 
property totaling $37,754.41 (May 10, 2004, Ruling Tfl8) 
3. Plaintiffs property borders Defendants' property on the North, West, and 
East. (May 10,2004, Ruling Tj 2) 
4. The road originally used by Plaintiff and other visitors to Plaintiffs 
property traverses from State Road 100 (west of the property). This route is the one 
which has, in past years, been commonly used to remove gravel and other materials from 
Defendants5 property and gravel pit, and is known as the Gravel Pit Road. (May 10, 2004, 
Ruling, f7 & 9). It is sometimes called the New Road, but it appears on aerial 
photographical maps as early as 1958(See Trial Exhibit 8, a reduced copy of which is 
attached as Appendix B). 
5. Beginning in 1999 and continuing through the erection of fences as late as 
2002, Defendant land-locked Plaintiffs property, preventing him from using or moving 
his purchased equipment or materials (May 10,2004, Ruling f 3, 18). 
6. There are two other less established paths to Plaintiffs property (May 10, 
2004, Ruling f7). The first is a shorter route from State Road 100 (to the west of 
Plaintiffs property and north of the Gravel Pit Road - the "North West Road") which is 
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in disrepair, and the second is a hunting or jeep trail over hills from McBride Lane (to the 
east of Plaintiff s property - the "East Road") (May 105 2004, Ruling f 12, 13). 
7. With regard to the North West Road, The Court found that "it would require 
a fair amount of work be done to allow the large trucks and equipment that Plaintiff will 
need to bring onto his property to conduct mining operations" (May 10, Ruling f 12). 
8. With regard to the East Road, the Court noted, 
It is the Defendants' contention that the East Road is less steep than the 
Gravel Pit Road, but this fact is disputed by Plaintiff. It was the Plaintiffs 
position that it would be prohibitive and expensive to upgrade said road, 
which was also the position of Defendants to improve the road from the 
gravel pit to Plaintiffs property (May 10, 2004, Ruling % 13) 
9. The Court awarded Plaintiff an easement by necessity and limited him to 
access by the East Road, stating that this road 
would provide the most reasonable access to Plaintiffs estate and the lease 
(sic) burdensome to Defendants' estate because it is the most traversed 
road, it is set far enough back from Defendants' property to present the least 
amount of devaluation and intrusion to Defendants' estate, and placing the 
easement on the East Road will make it easier for Defendants to prevent 
trespassing on their property and theft from their sand and gravel pit. 
Additionally, the Defendants agreed that they would permit an easement 
across their property via the East Road (May 10, 2004, Ruling page 8, last 
paragraph). 
10. No finding of the Court considered which road would be most convenient 
to Plaintiffs property or the most reasonable for Plaintiffs access. 
11. The Court found that Plaintiffs failure to obtain a building permit or enter 
into contracts for sand and gravel prevented him from recovering any damages for 
forcible detainer (May 10, 2004, Ruling, page 9, second paragraphs 1, 2). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed clear error as follows: 
1. In making a conclusion about the most reasonable access to Plaintiffs 
property, the trial court considered only what was most convenient for the servient estate, 
and failed to address or consider the issue of reasonableness or convenience to the 
dominant estate. 
2. The trial court's finding that the East Road is "the most traversed road" is 
not supported by the facts in evidence and is clearly erroneous. 
3. After determining that Plaintiff had been forcibly detained from his 
property since 1999, the trial court failed to award Plaintiff any damages for forcible 
detainer. 
Accordingly, this Court should find that the trial court committed clear error as set 
forth above, and should declare 
a. that the trial court should also have considered the access which is 
"reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate" in its findings and ruling 
(Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127 (Utah 1916); Savage v. Nielsen, 197 P. 2d 117,122 (Utah 
1948); 
b. that a preponderance of the evidence presented at trial clearly shows that the 
Gravel Pit Road is the only access to Plaintiffs property which is reasonable and 
convenient for Plaintiffs purposes; 
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c. That the evidence does not support a finding that Defendant's property 
would be burdened if Plaintiff was provided access through the gravel pit road. 
d. that Plaintiff is entitled to use the Gravel Pit Road for access to his property; 
e. that Plaintiff is entitled to damages as a result of Defendant's forcible 
detainer, which damages may include interest and depreciation on equipment and 
materials Plaintiff was unable to use or move as the result of the forcible detainer, the cost 
of permits Plaintiff was unable to use as the result of the forcible detainer, and attorney's 
fees incurred by Plaintiff as the result of Defendant's forcible detainer. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR IN CONSIDERING 
ONLY WHAT WAS MOST CONVENIENT FOR THE SERVIENT 
ESTATE, AND FAILING TO ADDRESS OR CONSIDER THE ISSUE 
OF REASONABLENESS AND CONVENIENCE TO THE DOMINANT 
ESTATE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "In construing any grant of right of way, 
the use, in character and extent, is limited to such as is reasonably necessary and 
convenient to the dominant estate and as little burdensome to the servient estate as 
possible" (Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127 (Utah 1916); Savage v. Nielsen, 197 P. 2d 117, 
122 (Utah 1948)). In its May 10, 2004, Ruling, the trial court failed to make any finding 
with regard to the reasonableness or convenience of any of the access routes to the 
dominant (Plaintiff) estate. In determining that the East Road was the most reasonable 
access route, the trial court listed the following findings supporting that conclusion: 
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a. The East Road was the most traversed road; 
b. The East Road was the [least] burdensome to Defendants' estate because 
1) the East Road is set far enough back from Defendants' property to 
present the least amount of devaluation and intrusion to Defendants9 estate, and 
2) placing the easement on the East Road [would] make it easier for 
Defendants to prevent trespassing on their property and theft from their sand and gravel 
pit. 
c. The East Road right-of-way was acceptable to Defendants (May 10, 2004, 
Ruling page 8, last paragraph). 
These findings each consider reasonableness or the issue of burdensomeness with 
respect to the servient (Defendant) property, but fail to consider the issue of 
reasonableness and convenience to the dominant (Plaintiff) estate. No finding in the 
entire Ruling dated May 10,2004, addresses the issues of reasonableness or convenience 
to the dominant estate. 
This Court should find that (in addition to making findings regarding the 
burdersomeness of the various routes of access) the trial court should also have 
considered the access which is "reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant 
estate" in its findings and ruling. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE EAST 
ROAD IS THE MOST TRAVERSED ROAD OF THE THREE ROADS CONSIDERED 
FOR PLAINTIFF'S ACCESS 
C:\WPDOCS\PROPERTY\Terrell\Appeal\Brief.wpd 8 
In order to demonstrate the trial court's clear error, Appellant must marshal the 
evidence "for" and "against" each issue. The evidence in favor of finding that the East 
Road is the most traversed road is summarized as follows: 
a. Jack McBride claimed the East Road is "well used." (Trial Transcript, p. 
20711. 11-16). He claimed that the West Road (Gravel Pit Road) is steeper than the East 
Road (Trial Transcript, p. 208,1. 8). McBride noted that the East Road provides access to 
the Carling and Co. gravel pit, and that Mr. Carling and a few others have used the East 
Road for access to the Carling gravel pit. 
b. Ansel Alison Robison described the East Road as "well traveled." (Trial 
Transcript, p. 178,11. 1 and 7). He testified that it would be possible to travel "twenty 
miles an hour or better" on the East Road (Trial Transcript, p. 178,1. 10), and later that he 
has seen "people chasing around in the mountains" near the East Road (Trial Transcript, 
p. 179,11. 12-18, p. 185,11. 7-11). Further Robison further testified that the East Road is 
less steep than the West (Gravel Pit) Road (Trial Transcript p. 178,1. 18). 
Evidence which controverts the conclusion that the East Road is the most traversed 
road is summarized as follows: 
a. No foundation was laid for either of the above witnesses' descriptions of 
"well used" or "well traveled." No witness designated what sort of traffic might have 
used the road frequently. No estimate was given of daily, weekly, monthly, or annual 
vehicular or other traffic on the East Road. No comparison of any objective measurement 
was made between the East Road and the Gravel Pit Road. 
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b. Robison controverted his own testimony by later describing the East Road 
(for hunting purposes) as the "road that don't exist" (Trial Transcript, p. 183,11. 17-25). 
He further acknowledged that he has never seen any equipment on the East Road but has 
identified heavy equipment on the Gravel Pit Road (Trial Transcript, p. 185,11. 12-18). 
Robison further acknowledged that he had traveled the Gravel Pit Road thirty or forty 
times (Trial Transcript, p. 180,11. 2-3), but had been on the East Road only twice, once 
about a month before the trial and once the day of the trial (Trial Transcript, p. 179,11. 12-
18; p. 195 11. 7-11). The Defendant testified that when Mr. Robison wanted to haul gravel 
from Defendant's gravel pit, he used the Gravel Pit road (rather than the East Road) (Trial 
Transcript, p. 209,1. 25 -p. 210,1. 2). Mr. Robinson further acknowledged that his 
experience of seeing "people chasing around in the mountains" near the East Road from 
his farm was an observation made from "a mile and an half or two miles" away, and that 
he, Robison, had only been to the East Road twice. (Trial Transcript, p. 185,11. 7-11, 
emphasis added). Robison stated, as his experience, that "every night you can see lights 
out there and I've seen people travel it all the time," during the times he visits his own 
farm, "most of the times at nights to change the water" (Trial Transcript, p. 184 11. 11-13. 
24-25). When asked if the lights of the vehicles he observed were "like four-wheelers," 
Robison claimed that "they're cars or pickups." When this answer was repeated back to 
him, Robison added, "or bigger trucks" (Trial Transcript, p. 184 11. 14-19). However, he 
stated later that he had never seen any vehicles he identified as heavy equipment on the 
East Road (Trial Transcript, p. 185,11. 12-18). In addition, Robison described himself as 
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a "good friend" of the Defendant who has known the Defendant "since high school," 
some "twenty, thirty years" (Trial Transcript, p. 179,11. 7-11). 
c. Glayde Edwards, who is experienced in road work and heavy equipment 
travel (Trial Transcript p. 58,11. 1-24) testified that "Up to the time the gate was locked, 
there was . . . trucks in and out of there [the Gravel Pit Road] the biggest, big part of the 
time, sometimes every day, sometimes maybe only once a week, but when we were 
hauling for Carlings we hauled every day about (Trial Transcript, p. 56 11. 24-25; p.57 11. 
1-3). Regarding the use of the Gravel Pit Road, Mr. Edwards testified, "[P]robably just 
about everybody in the east side of the county that's ever owned a dump truck has hauled 
gravel out of there at one time or another." He further testified that the Gravel Pit road 
was "the only road [trucks] could haul on" (Trial Transcript, p. 57,1.8). Mr. Edwards 
described the East Road as "impassable" (Trial Transcript, p. 40 11. 7-14). Edwards 
described the East Road as "a four-wheel drive road or an ATV trail, "used to be a wagon 
road" but that "you couldn't haul on it" (Trial Transcript, p. 40,11. 16-20). Edwards 
further testified that the East Road was steeper than the Gravel Pit Road, saying, "For a 
truck, a semi or a loaded, load of equipment of any kind to haul material in there from the 
east side would be totally impossible. I don't know of a truck that would make it" (Trial 
Transcript p. 40,11. 7-14). 
Defendants offered no evidence that any truck could use the East Road to travel to 
Plaintiffs' property. Jack McBride testified that trucks have traveled the portion of the 
East Road leading to the Carling gravel pit (which is within ten feet of McBride lane), but 
no witness testified to ever having seen a truck travel on the bulk of the East road, which 
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is between two and three miles in length. Traffic seen near the East Road by Robison 
was limited to vehicles that "chased around" an area where Robison himself traveled only 
twenty or so miles per hour (Trial Transcript, p. 178,1. 10; p.185,11. 7-11), which 
suggests light vehicles of a recreational nature (ATV's for example). There is no 
evidence in the testimony of the parties which would support a finding that the East Road 
is the most traversed road for the needs and purposes of the Plaintiff, which is for heavy 
vehicles to haul gravel and to move equipment and construction materials. 
In light of the lack of foundation for any finding of "most traversed road,9' the trial 
court clearly erred in making such a finding regarding the East Road. 
POINT III. 
A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
CLEARLY SHOWS THAT THE GRAVEL PIT ROAD IS THE ONLY 
ACCESS TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY WHICH IS REASONABLE 
AND CONVENIENT FOR PLAINTIFF'S PURPOSES 
Plaintiffs stated purposes of access are to haul gravel and conduct mining 
operations (May 10,2004, Ruling, ^ f 16). The East Road is neither reasonable nor 
convenient for Plaintiffs purposes because it does not support heavy vehicular traffic 
(See Point II, above). In addition, the Gravel Pit Road is more convenient because it is a 
shorter distance to an oiled road. The Gravel Pit Road is "not more than a mile to a mile 
and a quarter" to State Road 100 which is an oiled road. (Transcript p.38,11.4-5). In 
contrast the East Road is "between two and three miles" to the nearest oiled road. 
(Transcript p.44,11. 24-25, p.45,1.1). 
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In addition, the Gravel Pit Road has been a well maintained road. The State of 
Utah and Millard County used the road with large trucks to remove sand and gravel (May 
10,2004, Ruling p.2). In fact, the State of Utah and Millard County graded the road 
leading into the sand and gravel pit during removal operations. Id. In fact the Gravel Pit 
Road was used so extensively that in 1999 a public hearing was held to determine 
whether or not the road was in fact a county road.(May 10,2004, Ruling p.3). 
Additionally, Clifford Cartwright's testimony proffered at trial estimated that it 
wold cost approximately $24,000 to improve the north access road [North Road] and "// 
somebody were somehow miraculously to cut a road from the east it would be even 
double that." (Transcript p.243,11.4-10, emphasis added). Even Mr. Robinson testified 
that the final stretch of the East Road was "possible but its just really rough" (Transcript 
p.185,11.23-25, p. 186,11. 1-5). 
Moreover, the repair or construction of the East Road for Plaintiffs purposes is 
not feasible because the East Road traverses the property of third parties who are not 
parties to this action. Glayde Edwards described repairing or constructing the East Road 
as being "completely out of reason on the expense because in order to make a passable 
road they'd have to realign it, and with all the other property owners that are on the road 
and that which it crosses I don't think any of them would ever go along with it" 
(Transcript p.44,11. 14-18). On the other hand, the witnesses testified as noted above 
(Point II) that the Gravel Pit Road is used by heavy equipment and is, therefore, passable. 
While the final stretch of the road right into Plaintiffs property "needs some repair...it's 
still a passable road" (Glayde Edwards, Transcript p.36,11. 14-25, p.37,11. 1-3). Most 
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importantly, Glayde Edwards testified that the Gravel Pit Road is the only road a truck 
can travel to reach Plaintiffs property (Transcript p.43,11. 22-23.). 
The Gravel Pit Road is clearly the most reasonable and convenient road for 
Plaintiffs access because the Gravel Pit Road accesses an oiled road in a shorter distance 
(the East Road is over twice as long), because it does not involve the permission of third-
party property owners, and because the Gravel Road the only access road which is 
passable by heavy trucks. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
COULD ONLY ACCESS HIS PROPERTY THROUGH THE EAST ROAD BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY WOULD BE BURDENED IF PLAINTIFF WERE 
PROVIDED ACCESS THROUGH THE GRAVEL PIT ROAD. 
In order to demonstrate the trial court's clear error in making such a finding, 
Appellant must marshal the evidence "for" and "against" each issue. The evidence in 
favor of finding that Defendant's property would be burdened if Plaintiff were provided 
access through the Gravel Pit Road is as follows: 
1) the East Road is set far enough back from Defendants' property to present 
the least amount of devaluation and intrusion to Defendants' estate, and 
2) placing the easement on the East Road [would] make it easier for 
Defendants to prevent trespassing on their property and theft from their sand and gravel 
pit (May 10,2004, Ruling, p. 8, last paragraph). 
These findings were made without any underlying facts or foundation. No 
evidence was offered that Defendants' property value would decrease by permitting 
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Plaintiff access through the Gravel Pit Road. In fact, Defendant Jack McBride testified 
that he allows Robison access to the gravel pit through the Gravel Pit Road when Robison 
wishes to haul gravel (Trial Transcript, p. 209,1. 25 -p. 210,1. 2). The anticipated use of 
the Gravel Pit Road by Plaintiffs conforms with the existing use of the Gravel Pit Road, 
which has been (for many years) to transport loads of sand and gravel. Additionally, if 
Plaintiff were granted access through the Gravel Pit Road, he would maintain the Gravel 
Pit Road from SR 100 to his property, which would benefit the Defendants. 
Additionally, any burden which might be speculated to accrue to the Defendants 
would enure to the third-party owners of property surrounding the East Road as well, 
which property owners have not previously allowed heavy equipment to traverse their 
property, and who are not parties to this action. In fact, because the intended use of the 
Gravel Pit Road is the same as the current use by the Defendants, it seems likely that the 
property holders along the East Roadway would actually suffer a greater burden than the 
Defendants in this case. 
The trial court erred in finding (without foundation) that a burden upon Defendants 
property would be created by Plaintiffs access through the Gravel Pit Road, and erred in 
neglecting to consider the burden placed upon owners of property who are not parties to 
this action by ordering Plaintiff to use the East Road. 
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POINT V. 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO USE THE GRAVEL PIT ROAD FOR 
ACCESS TO HIS PROPERTY 
Pursuant to the standard set forth in Morris v. Blunt, and Savage v. Nielsen, (id), 
"In construing any grant of right of way, the use, in character and extent, is limited to 
such as is reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate and as little 
burdensome to the servient estate as possible"). The trial court should have balanced its 
findings of what access is reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant (Plaintiff) 
estate with the use which is a little burdensome to the servient (Defendant) estate as 
possible. 
Not only did the trial court fail to make the required findings, it failed to balance 
the needs of the dominant and servient estates as set forth in Morris or Savage. However, 
it should be clear that Defendant's burden from Plaintiffs usage of the Gravel Pit Road 
does not weigh sufficiently to deny Plaintiff his necessary, reasonable and convenient 
access through the Gravel Pit Road. This is a mixed question of fact and law, and the 
Court should use the standard of clear error for review of the findings involved and 
should review the conclusions of the trial court for correctness. 
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POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD PLAINTIFF 
DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF DEFENDANT'S FORCIBLE 
DETAINER. 
The forcible detainer cause of action was brought pursuant to Utah Code Section 
78-36-2. 
Clear evidence was introduced that Plaintiff was forcibly detained because the 
Defendants constructed a fence with locked gates along Plaintiffs boundary line. 
Pursuant to statute, Plaintiff was entitled to recover attorney's fees. Defendant Jack 
McBride tendered through counsel a claim for a key which would permit Plaintiff to 
access his land, but the key tendered by the Defendants does not open any of the locked 
gates. Even today, Mr. Terrell remains forcibly detained from access to his property. 
Additionally, the trial court erred in determining that Plaintiff had failed to take the 
substantial steps necessary to mine his land and construct a building thereon. The 
evidence clearly showed that Plaintiff had expended $59,935.11 for building materials, 
equipment and permits. Additionally, Plaintiff expended $800.00 in surveying costs 
(Ruling, May, 10, 2004, p. 7, first paragraph). Clearly these expenditures show 
"substantial steps" on Plaintiffs part to use the land for economic purposes. 
This Court should declare that the trial court erred in failing to award damages to 
Plaintiff for Defendants' forcible detainer. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff/Appellant has demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that the trial 
court's Ruling was clearly erroneous in the following regards: 
1. Considering only what was most convenient for the servient estate, and 
failing to address or consider the issue of reasonableness or convenience to the dominant 
estate. 
2. Finding that the East Road is "the most traversed road." 
3. After determining that Plaintiff had been forcibly detained from his 
property since 1999, failing to award Plaintiff any damages for forcible detainer. 
Plaintiff/Appellant should be entitled to relief from the final Judgment of the trial 
court, including granting the Plaintiff reasonably necessary and convenient access to his 
property, together damages and attorney's fees for Defendant's forcible detainer. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 10th day of August, 2005. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify thatjieur true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, to Randall Smart, Attorney for Appellee, at 
Randall Smart 
SMART SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Murray UT 84107 
this 10th day of August, 2005. 
i$a Jy. <JU&*^. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN GUY TERRELL by and 
through his Guardian ad Litem CLARK 
WALTERS TERRELL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JACK E. McBRIDE and 
EDNA S. McBRIDE. 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 020700057 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
This matter comes before the Court on a bench trial held March 4, 2004 and March 29, 
2004. Evidence was presented to the Court by witness testimony, documents, and oral argument 
from counsel. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the matter under advisement. The 
Court now issues the following: 
FACTUAL SUMMARY 
1. Plaintiff Stephen Guy Terrell is the owner of a 40-acre parcel of real property 
located in Section 10, Township 21 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian and further 
described as follows: 
Southwest Quarter (SW1/4) of the Northeast Quarter (NE1/4) of Section 10(10) 
in Township Twenty-one (21) South Range Five (5) West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
Plaintiffs family acquired the property at issue in 1955 from the United States of America as part 
of Utah State School and Institutional Trust Lands, and it was transferred to Plaintiff in 1998. 
2. Family members of Defendant Jack E. McBride acquired property adjacent to 
Plaintiffs property in 1955 from the United States of America. Defendants' property now 
borders Plaintiffs property on the North, West, and East. 
3. Defendant Jack E. McBride has built fences bordering Plaintiffs property on the 
North and West. When originally placed, the fence posts for the North fence encroached slightly 
onto Plaintiffs property. Once Defendant Jack E. McBride was notified of this, he pulled the 
posts immediately and placed the fence on his own property, three feet behind his property line. 
Defendant Jack E. McBride built the North and West fences in December of 2002. These fences 
have left Plaintiffs property land locked and have forcibly prevented him from accessing his 
property. 
4. Locks have been placed on the gates to regulate access to Defendants' property. 
uNo Trespassing" signs have also been placed along Defendants' property gates to warn the 
public that the property is private. Sheriff Phillips' testimony corroborated the fact that 
Defendants' property has had "No Trespassing" signs posted since the early 1960s and that the 
gate in question has generally been locked. 
5. Defendant Jack E. McBride has forced hunters and other trespassers to leave if 
they are found on his property. Defendants have gone to great lengths to keep individuals from 
trespassing on their private property and have never left it open for public use. Despite these 
efforts, on many occasions, individuals have cut the locks on Defendants' gates or stole the "No 
Trespassing" signs. 
6. There is a large sand gravel pit located on Defendants' property. Over the years, 
Defendants have entered into agreements for profit with the State of Utah, Millard County, 
private companies, and individuals to remove sand and gravel from Defendants' sand and gravel 
pit. In the past, as the State of Utah and Millard County removed sand and gravel, they graded 
the road leading into the sand and gravel pit in order to protect the large trucks that were being 
used to haul out material from Defendants' sand and gravel pit, but otherwise have provided no 
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maintenance of said road. Neither the State, nor Millard County, has ever maintained any other 
road located on Defendants' property. There was no testimony that the State or Millard county 
ever created the Gravel Pit Road to provide access to the public across Defendants' property. 
7. When the agreements to remove sand and gravel were made, Defendants provided 
access to the sand and gravel pit through a gate that runs along the western border of Defendants' 
property, to the east of State Road 100 (SRI 00). At the time of the 1955 conveyances, this route 
from SRI 00 to the gravel pit property was the most commonly used road to remove gravel and 
other materials from the property. After the conveyance, this road was used by visitors to 
Plaintiffs property. There are also other less established paths from Plaintiffs property from 
Defendants' property. 
8. Defendants have also had to contend with individuals stealing sand and gravel from 
the pit when Defendants are unable to monitor their property. Defendant Jack E McBride has 
caught Plaintiff and others trespassing on his property in the past. As a result, Defendants have 
contacted the Sheriffs Office in Millard County. Deputies responded at least one time and talked 
with Plaintiff telling him to stay off of Defendants' property, but they have never arrested Plaintiff 
On one other occasion, Defendant Jack E. McBride caught Plaintiff trespassing on his property 
and asked him to leave, at which point Plaintiff acknowledged that he knew he should not be there 
and stated he would leave the property. 
9. In 1999, as contentions regarding trespassers and access to Plaintiffs property 
through Defendants' property began to rise, a hearing was held by the Millard County 
Commission regarding Defendants' property and the Gravel Pit Road. Following the meeting, Le 
Ray G. Jackson, the Millard County Attorney, sent a letter to Jack McBride regarding the Gravel 
Pit Road, stating that the Gravel Pit Road is not a county road. 
10. There is no defined road through Defendants' sand and gravel pit because it 
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constantly changes as trucks and other equipment move through the pit to remove sand and 
gravel. There is a road from the South East portion of Defendants' sand and gravel pit leading 
into Plaintiffs property, which has always been in poor condition. It would be extremely difficult 
to move a front-end loader or truck from Defendants5 sand and gravel pit up to Plaintiffs 
property on this particular road. 
11. A substantial amount of work would be required to place a permanent road 
through Defendants' sand and gravel pit and make it possible for the kind of equipment and trucks 
Plaintiff is contemplating to enter from Defendants' pit onto the North West corner of Plaintiff s 
property. If an easement were granted on the Gravel Pit Road, it would greatly diminish the 
future value of Defendants' property and it would make it much more difficult for Defendants to 
prevent theft of their sand and gravel and keep trespassers off their property. 
12. Several other roads traverse the properties owned by Defendants and Plaintiff. 
Aside from the Gravel Pit Road, only two other roads could provide access to Plaintiffs property. 
North of the Gravel Pit Road, is a road that served as the main ingress and egress to Defendants' 
property from the west in the past. That road has since fallen into disrepair, as it has not served 
as the primary western entrance to Defendants' property since approximately 1962 to 1963, when 
the Gravel Pit Road was built. It would require a fair amount of work be done to allow the large 
trucks and equipment that Plaintiff will need to bring onto his property to conduct mining 
operations. 
13. The North West Road goes around Defendants' sand and gravel pit and would 
allow egress and ingress to Plaintiffs property from the South East corner of Defendants' 
property. The third road providing access to Plaintiffs property, would allow access from the 
East off of McBride Lane, and crosses the South East corner of Defendants' property. It is the 
Defendants' contention that the East Road is less steep than the Gravel Pit Road, but this fact is 
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disputed by Plaintiff. It was the Plaintiffs position that it would be prohibitive and expensive to 
upgrade said road, which was also the position of Defendants to improve the road from the gravel 
pit to Plaintiffs property. 
14. From 1955 to the present, the only activities conducted on Defendants' property 
were dumping bones from the meat packing plant located in Fillmore on Defendants' property, 
and occasional visits from Plaintiffs family and guests. For the past twenty years Clark Walters 
Terrell only visited Defendants' property once a year. Plaintiff is 72 years old, is a disabled 
veteran, and his only income comes from the government in the form of disability payments 
15. Defendants' have not given an easement to anyone either verbally or in writing. 
16. Plaintiff intends to conduct some form of mining and hauling of sand and gravel 
from his property. Plaintiff has obtained a Mineral Lease in 1999 to perform such activities on his 
property and has had some samples from his property analyzed. This lease is in addition to his 
owner's right to remove common sand and gravel from the property. 
17. Plaintiff obtained a well permit for the subject property in 2001. The well permit 
number is 67-1170(A70205) and has been filed with the State of Utah Department of Natural 
Resources Division of Water Rights. Plaintiff has until December 31, 2005 to provide Proof of 
Beneficial Use of said water. There was an error in the legal description of the well, but that error 
has been corrected. 
18. Plaintiff spent money in 1998 and 1999 for equipment and construction materials 
for a structure on the property which he claims he has been unable to use since being locked out 
of his property by Defendants in 1999. Plaintiff spent the following: 
1 Rollins Mechanical 
Dutson Machine 
Mack's 
$11,569.41 
$4,000.00 
$12,000.00 
steel I and H beams 
equipment, scraper and loader 
two tractors and engine repair on boom truck 
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Aurora Welding 
Metal Mart 
Piute Trailer 
Total 
$1,185.00 
$5,000.00 
$4,000.00 
$37,754.41 
steel I and H beams 
steal beams and tubing 
steel beams and pipe 
19. However, Plaintiff has not made provisions for tanks, communication lines, 
pipelines, processing plants, or reservoirs. Plaintiff has not determined if he will be removing 
enough mineral or rock products from his property to qualify as commercial quantities. Plaintiff 
has not conducted any preliminary analysis to determine what amount, if any, is necessary to post 
a bond for reclamation purposes. Plaintiff has not entered into any agreements with any person or 
entity to sell the sand, gravel, or other minerals that may be located on his property. No evidence 
was presented indicating anyone had been to Plaintiffs property and determined what the costs 
for, or possibility of moving trucks on and off of Plaintiff s property. 
20. In order to remove sand and gravel or conduct mining operations on Plaintiffs 
property, a conditional use permit would be required from Millard County since Plaintiffs 
property is located in a Range and Forest Zone. At the time of trial, neither Plaintiff, nor anyone 
on Plaintiffs behalf, had filed an application for a conditional use permit with the Millard County 
Planning and Zoning Administrator's office to mine minerals on Plaintiffs property. At the time 
of trial, neither Plaintiff, nor anyone on Plaintiffs behalf, had filed an application for a conditional 
use permit with the Millard County Planning and Zoning Administrator's office to take sand and 
gravel from his property. 
21. • A building permit is required to construct any structures on Plaintiffs property. 
At the time of trial, neither Plaintiff nor anyone on Plaintiffs behalf had filed an application for a 
building permit with Millard County. 
22. In March 2002, Plaintiff filed this action claiming access right (1) under a 
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declaration of public access, (2) easement by way of necessity or by implication, and/or (3) 
easement by prescription. Plaintiff also sought damages for Defendants' forcible detainer. 
Specifically, Plaintiff is seeking treble damages on prejudgment interest on monies spent in 1998 
and 1999, which totals $59,935.11, survey costs of $800, attorney's fees of $7,096.00, and costs 
of$153.00. 
RULING 
Public Access 
In order to succeed on a claim of public access, the Plaintiff must show that roadways on 
Defendants' property are open to the public without restriction or hindrance by the Defendants. 
Utah Code Section 72-5-101. The only evidence of public use of roadways on Defendants' 
property was the evidence of trespassers. However, the Court finds that Defendants have taken 
reasonable measures to prevent trespassers from enter their property. Therefore, this Court finds 
that defendant failed to meet his burden of proof that any roadway on Defendants' property is 
open to the public without restriction or hindrance by the Defendants, and the Court denies 
Petitioner's public access claim. 
Easement by Prescription 
In order to succeed on a claim of easement by prescription, the Plaintiff must show that 
there was open, notorious, and adverse use of a roadway for a period of at least twenty (20) 
years. Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117 (Utah App. 1994). It is clear to the Court that Plaintiff 
and his family occasionally visited Defendants' property and dumped bones on the property over 
30 years ago. There was also testimony that Plaintiffs family occasionally used the road from 
SRI 00 to the sand pit. However, even if the Court found that this minimal use met the 
requirements of prescriptive easement, the Court could only grant access consistent with 
Plaintiffs prior use, and the Court can not enlarge that use to accommodate Plaintiffs desire to 
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start his own gravel pit. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show a sufficient continuous 
use of a roadway for at least a twenty (20) year period and denies Petitioner's easement by 
prescription claim. 
Easement by Necessity 
In order to succeed on a claim of easement by necessity, the Plaintiff must show a unity of 
title was followed by severance; the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible at the time of 
severance; the easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and the 
use of the easement was continuous and self acting, as distinguished from one used only from time 
to time when occasion arises. Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127 (Utah 1916); Savage v. Nielsen, 197 
P.2d 117, 122 (Utah 1948). In this case, the evidence presented established that there had been a 
unity of title followed by severance and that an easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment 
of the dominant estate because Plaintiffs property is landlocked. 
However, this does not give Plaintiff the right to choose the location of his easement 
across Defendants property. Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916). In construing any 
grant of right of way, the use, in character and extent, is limited to such as is reasonably necessary 
and convenient to the dominant estate and as little burdensome to the servient estate as possible 
for the use contemplated. Id 
In this case, the evidence presented was that the East Road is the roadway that would 
provide the most reasonable access to Plaintiffs estate and the lease burdensome to Defendants' 
estate because it is the most traversed road, it is set far enough back from Defendants' property to 
present the least amount of devaluation and intrusion to Defendants' estate, and placing the 
easement on the East Road will make it easier for Defendants to prevent trespassing on their 
property and theft from their sand and gravel pit. Additionally, the Defendants agreed that they 
would permit an easement across their property via the East Road. 
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Forcible Detainer 
Plaintiff has brought a forcible detainer cause of action under Utah Code Section 78-36-2 
because Defendants blocked all roads and paths precluding Plaintiffs from accessing their 
property. It is clear that Plaintiff is entitled to be restored access to his land. However, the 
Plaintiff has failed to provide this Court with enough evidence for the Court to award damages 
under this cause of action. 
While Plaintiff presented evidence showing a desire to mine, haul sand and gravel, build 
structures, and construct a water well, the evidence presented also showed that Plaintiff had failed 
to take the substantial steps necessary to make these desires a reality by obtaining the required 
permits, or entering into contracts. Therefore, the Court will not award damages to the Plaintiff. 
Additionally, the Court declines to award attorney's fees and orders that each side with pay their 
own attorney's fees and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that Plaintiff is granted an easement by 
necessity on the East Road. The Court denies all other claims. Counsel for Plaintiffs is Ordered 
to prepare and Order and Judgment, submit it to counsel for Defendants for review, and then to 
the Court for execution. 
DATED this day of May, 2004 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHEN GUY TERRELL by and through 
his Guardian ad Litem 
CLARK WALTERS TERRELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK E. McBRIDE and 
EDNA S. McBRIDE, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 020700057 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
This matter having come before the Court on a bench trial held March 4, 2004 and March 
29,2004, evidence having been presented to the Court by witness testimony, documents, and 
oral argument from counsel, and the Court having taken the matter under advisement, the Court 
now issues the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Stephen Guy Terrell is the owner of a 40-acre parcel of real property 
located in section 10, Township 21 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian and further 
described as follows: 
Southwest Quarter (SW1/4) of the Northeast Quarter (NE1/4) of Section 10(10) in 
Township Twenty-one (21) South Range Five (5) West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
Plaintiffs family acquired the property at issue in 1955 from the United States of America as 
part of Utah State School and Institutional Trust Lands, and it was transferred to Plaintiff in 
1998. 
2. Family members of Defendant Jack E. McBride acquired property adjacent to 
Plaintiffs property in 1955 from the United States of America. Defendant's property now 
borders Plaintiffs property on the North, West, and East. 
3. Defendant Jack E. McBride has built fences bordering Plaintiffs property on the 
North and West. When originally placed, the fence posts for the North fence encroached slightly 
onto Plaintiffs property. Once Defendant Jack E. McBride was notified of this, he pulled the 
posts immediately and placed the fence on his own property, three feet behind his property line. 
Defendant Jack E. McBride built the North and West fences in December of 2002. These fences 
have left Plaintiffs property land locked and have forcibly prevented him from accessing his 
property. 
4. Locks have been placed on the gates to regulate access to Defendants' property. 
"No Trespassing" signs have also been placed along Defendants' property gates to warn the 
public that the property is private. Sheriff Phillips' testimony corroborated the fact that 
Defendants' property has had "No Trespassing" signs posted since the early 1960s and that the 
gate in question has generally been locked. 
5. Defendant Jack E. McBride has forced hunters and other trespassers to leave if 
they are found on his property. Defendants have gone to great lengths to keep individuals from 
trespassing on their private property and have never left it open for public use. Despite these 
efforts, on many occasions, individuals have cut the locks on Defendants' gates or stole the "No 
Trespassing" signs. 
6. There is a large sand gravel pit located on Defendants' property. Over the years, 
Defendants have entered into agreements for profit with the State of Utah, Millard County, 
private companies, and individuals to remove sand and gravel from Defendants' sand and gravel 
pit. In the past, as the State of Utah and Millard County removed sand and gravel, they graded 
the road leading into the sand and gravel pit in order to protect the large trucks that were being 
used to haul out material from Defendants' sand and gravel pit, but otherwise have provided no 
maintenance of said road. Neither the State, nor Millard County, has ever maintained any other 
road located on Defendants' property. There is no testimony that the State or Millard County 
ever created the Gravel Pit Road to provide access to the public across Defendants' property. 
7. When the agreements to remove sand and gravel were made, Defendants provided 
access to the sand and gravel pit through a gate that runs along the western border of Defendants' 
property, to the east of State Road 100 (SR 100). At the time of the 1955 conveyances, this route 
from SR 100 to the gravel pit property was the most commonly used road to remove gravel and 
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other materials from the property. After the conveyance, this road was used by visitors to 
Plaintiff s property. 
8. Defendants have also had to contend with individuals stealing sand and gravel 
from the pit when Defendants are unable to monitor their property. Defendant Jack E. McBride 
has caught Plaintiff and others trespassing on his property in the past. As a result, Defendants 
have contacted the Sheriffs Office in Millard County. Deputies responded at least one time and 
talked with Plaintiff telling him to stay off of Defendants' property, but they have never arrested 
Plaintiff. On one other occasion, Defendant Jack E. McBride caught Plaintiff trespassing on his 
property and asked him to leave, at which point Plaintiff acknowledged that he knew he should 
not be there and stated he would leave the property. 
9. In 1999, as contentions regarding trespassers and access to Plaintiffs property 
through Defendants' property began to rise, a hearing was held by the Millard County 
Commission regarding Defendants' property and the Gravel Pit Road. Following the meeting, 
Le Ray G. Jackson, the Millard County Attorney, sent a letter to Defendant Jack E. McBride 
regarding the Gravel Pit Road, stating that the Gravel Pit Road is not a county road. 
10. There is no defined road through Defendants' sand and gravel pit because it 
constantly changes as trucks and other equipment move through the pit to remove sand and 
gravel. There is a road from the South East portion of Defendants' sand and gravel pit leading 
into Plaintiffs property, which has always been in poor condition. It would be extremely 
difficult to move a front-end loader or truck from Defendants' sand and gravel pit up to 
Plaintiff s property on this particular road. 
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11. A substantial amount of work would be required to place a permanent road 
through Defendants' sand and gravel pit and make it possible for the kind of equipment and 
trucks Plaintiff is contemplating to enter from Defendants' pit onto the North West corner of 
Plaintiffs property. If an easement were granted on the Gravel Pit Road, it would greatly 
diminish the future value of Defendants' property and it would make it much more difficult for 
Defendants to prevent theft of their sand and gravel and keep trespassers off their property. 
12. Several other roads traverse the properties owned by Defendants and Plaintiff. 
Aside from the Gravel Pit Road, only two other roads could provide access to Plaintiffs 
property. North of the Gravel Pit road, is a road that served as the main ingress and egress to 
Defendants' property from the west in the past. That road has since fallen into disrepair, as it has 
not served as the primary western entrance to Defendants' property since approximately 1962 to 
1963, when the Gravel Pit Road was built. It would require a fair amount of work be done to 
allow the large trucks and equipment that Plaintiff will need to bring onto his property to conduct 
mining operations. 
13. The North West Road goes around Defendants' sand and gravel pit and would 
allow egress and ingress to Plaintiffs property from the South East corner of Defendants' 
property. The third road providing access to Plaintiffs property, would allow access from the 
East off of McBride Lane, and crosses the South East corner of Defendants' property. 
14. From 1955 to the present, the only activities conducted on Defendants' property 
were dumping bones from the meat packing plant located in Fillmore on Defendants' property, 
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and occasional visits from Plaintiffs family and guests. For the past twenty years Clark Walters 
Terrell only visited Defendants' property once a year. 
15. Plaintiff is 72 years old, is a disabled veteran, and his only income comes from 
the government in the form of disability payments. 
16. Defendants' have not given an easement to anyone either verbally or in writing. 
17. Plaintiff intends to conduct some form of mining and hauling of sand and gravel 
from his property. Plaintiff has obtained a Mineral Lease in 1999 to perform such activities on 
his property and has had some samples from his property analyzed. This lease is in addition to 
his owner's right to remove common sand and gravel from the property. 
18. Plaintiff obtained a well permit for the subject property in 2001. The well permit 
number is 67-1170(A70205) and has been filed with the State of Utah Department of Natural 
Resources Division of Water Rights. Plaintiff has until December 31,2005 to provide Proof of 
Beneficial Use of said water. There was an error in the legal description of the well, but that 
error has been corrected. 
19. Plaintiff spent money in 1998 and 1999 for equipment and construction materials 
for a structure on the property that he claims he has been unable to use since being locked out of 
his property by Defendants in 1999. Plaintiff spent the following: 
Rollins Mechanical 
Dutson Machine 
Mack's 
$11,569.41 
$4,000.00 
$12,000.00 
steel I and H beams 
equipment, scraper and loader 
two tractors and engine repair 
on boom truck 
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Aurora Welding 
Metal Mart 
Piute Trailer 
Total 
$1,185.00 
$5,000.00 
$4,000.00 
$37,754.41 
steel I and H beams 
steel beams and tubing 
steel beams and pipe 
20. However, Plaintiff has not made provisions for tanks, communications lines, 
pipelines, processing plants, or reservoirs. Plaintiff has not determined if he will be removing 
enough mineral or rock products from his property to qualify as commercial quantities. Plaintiff 
has not conducted any preliminary analysis to determine what amount, if any, is necessary to 
post a bond for reclamation purposes. Plaintiff has not entered into any agreements with any 
person or entity to sell the sand, gravel, or other minerals that may be located on his property. 
No evidence was presented indicating anyone had been to Plaintiffs property and determined 
what the costs for, or possibility of moving trucks on and off of Plaintiff s property. 
21. In order to remove sand and gravel or conduct mining operations on Plaintiffs 
property, a conditional use permit would be required from Millard County since Plaintiffs 
property is located in a Range and Forest Zone. At the time of trial, neither Plaintiff, nor anyone 
on Plaintiffs behalf, had filed an application for a conditional use permit with the Millard 
County Planning and Zoning Administrator's office to mine minerals on Plaintiffs property. At 
the time of trial, neither Plaintiff, nor anyone on Plaintiffs behalf, had filed an application for a 
conditional use permit with the Millard County Planning and Zoning Administrator's office to 
take sand and gravel from his property. 
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22. A building permit is required to construct any structures on Plaintiffs property. 
At the time of trial, neither Plaintiff nor anyone on Plaintiffs behalf had filed an application for a 
building permit with Millard County. 
23. In March 2002, Plaintiff filed this action claiming access right (1) under a 
declaration of public access, (2) easement by way of necessity or by implication, and/or (3) 
easement by prescription. Plaintiff also sought damages for Defendants' forcible detainer. 
Specifically, Plaintiff is seeking treble damages on prejudgment interest on monies spent in 1998 
and 1999, which totals $59,935.11, survey costs of $800.00, attorney's fees of $7,096.00, and 
costs of $153.00. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Public Access 
1. In order to succeed on a claim of public access, the Plaintiff must show that 
roadways on Defendants' property are open to the public without restriction or hindrance by the 
Defendants. Utah Code § 72-5-101. The only evidence of public use of roadways on 
Defendants' property was the evidence of trespassers. However, the Court finds that Defendants 
have taken reasonable measures to prevent trespassers from entering their property. Therefore, 
this Court finds that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof that any roadway on Defendants' 
property is open to the public without restriction or hindrance by the Defendants, and the Court 
denies Plaintiffs public access claim. 
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Easement by Prescription 
2. In order to succeed on a claim of easement by prescription, the Plaintiff must 
show that there was open, notorious, and adverse use of a roadway for a period of at least twenty 
(20) years. Green v. Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117 (Utah App. 1994). It is clear to the Court that 
Plaintiff and his family occasionally visited Defendants' property and dumped bones on the 
property over 30 years ago. There was also testimony that Plaintiffs family occasionally used 
the road from SRI 00 to the sand pit. However, even if the Court found that this minimal use met 
the requirements of prescriptive easement, the Court could only grant access consistent with 
Plaintiffs prior use, and the Court cannot enlarge that use to accommodate Plaintiffs desire to 
start his own gravel pit. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show a sufficient continuous 
use of a roadway for at least a twenty (20) year period and denies Plaintiffs easement by 
prescription claim. 
Easement by Necessity 
3. In order to succeed on a claim of easement by necessity, the Plaintiff must show a 
unity of title was followed by severance; the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible at the 
time of severance; the easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate; 
and the use of the easement was continuous and self acting, as distinguished from one used only 
from time to time when occasion arises. Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127 (Utah 1916); Savage v. 
Nielsen, 197 P.2d 117,122 (Utah 1948). In this case, the evidence presented established that 
there had been a unity of title followed by severance and that an easement is reasonably 
necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate because Plaintiffs property is landlocked. 
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4. However, this does not give Plaintiff the right to choose the location of his 
easement across Defendants' property. Morris v. Blunt, 161 P. 1127, 1133 (Utah 1916). In 
construing any grant of right of way, the use, in character and extent, is limited to such as is 
reasonably necessary and convenient to the dominant estate and as little burdensome to the 
servient estate as possible for the use contemplated. Id. 
5. In this case, the evidence presented was that the East Road is the roadway that 
would provide the most reasonable access to Plaintiffs estate and the least burden to 
Defendants' estate because it is the most traversed road, it is set far enough back from 
Defendants' property to present the least amount of devaluation and intrusion to Defendants' 
estate, and placing the easement on the East Road will make it easier for Defendants to prevent 
trespassing on their property and theft from their sand and gravel pit. Additionally, the 
Defendants agreed that they would permit an easement across their property via the East Road. 
Forcible Detainer 
6. Plaintiff has brought a forcible detainer cause of action under Utah Code § 78-36-
2 because Defendants blocked all roads and paths precluding Plaintiff from accessing his 
property. It is clear that Plaintiff is entitled to be restored access to his land. However, the 
Plaintiff has failed to provide this Court with enough evidence for the Court to award damages 
under this cause of action. 
7. While Plaintiff presented evidence showing a desire to mine, haul sand and 
gravel, build structures, and construct a water well, the evidence presented also showed that 
Plaintiff had failed to take the substantial steps necessary to make these desires a reality by 
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obtaining the required permits, or entering into contracts. Therefore, the Court will not award 
damages to the Plaintiff. Additionally, the Court declines to award attorney's fees and orders 
that each side pay their own attorney's fees and costs. 
DATED this day of ,2004. 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE DONALD J. EYRE 
Fourth District Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the M day of August, 2004, I served a copy of the 
foregoing FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW on the following by 
depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
123 East 100 North, First Floor 
P.O. Box 67 
Payson,Utah 84651 
Jack E. McBride 
Box 503 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
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RandallR. Smart (#2983) 
SMART, SCHOF1ELD, SH 3RTER & LUNCEFOED 
A Profe^onal evaporation 
5295 South Commerce Driv j (Suite #200) 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone (801) 747-0647 
Facsimile (801) 747-1049 
Attorney for Defendants 
FILED 
COUNTY CLERK & EX-OFFICE CLERK 
QF THE PISTflieT COURT 
MILLARD COUNTY 
IN I HE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN ANI > FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLERK I 
w j f t? nFPHTv) 
STEPHEN GUY TERRELI by and through 
his Guardian ad Litem 
CLARK WALTERS TERR 3LL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK E-McBRIDE and 
EDNA S. McBRIDE, 
Defendant 3. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 020700057 
Judge Donald J, Eyre 
On March 4,2004 a id March 29,2004, a bench trial was held in the above-captioned 
matter. Wiiford R Hansen, Jr. was present on behalf of Plaintiff and Randall R. Smart was 
present on behalf of the Dei aidants. 
The Court, having c Kisidered the relief sought by Plaintiff in his Complaint, and having 
heard evidence in the form »f witness testimony, documents, and having heard the arguments of 
counsel and for other cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDER] D, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiflis s itified to an easement onflss East Road, which provides aeoess to 
Plaintiffs p operty from McBride Lane and crosses the South East section of 
Defendants' property. 
2. All other cai ises of action stated in Plaintiffs Compiaist arts dismissed with 
prejwiice, 
3, Each party i \ responsible for their own attorneys' fees. 
4, Defe^cbnts! are awarded tfepir costs 
DATED this ff dayof 
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